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SAHARAN AFRICA DIFFERENT? 
  
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Kevin Sylwester 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine if the impact of foreign aid on inequality and 
poverty differs in sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions. Using cross sectional and panel 
data analysis, we find that there is no strong evidence that foreign aid differently affects income 
disparity and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. These findings seem to coincide with the main 
conclusions of the literature on foreign aid’s effectiveness. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than 50 years foreign aid has been used by developed countries and aid 
agencies to stimulate growth, and consequently to  alleviate poverty and reduce income disparity 
in poor countries. The effect of foreign aid on growth has proved controversial. For instance, 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) assert that foreign aid favors growth in the presence of good 
macroeconomic policies. Easterly (2003) finds that foreign  aid does not have any significant 
effect on growth, even if good policies are implemented in recipient countries. However, there 
has been little work on the relationship between aid and poverty. But even here, the findings 
seem to be divisive. Collier and Dollar (2002) uncover that aid decreases poverty in the presence 
of good institutions.  Arvin and Barillas (2002) reveal that though aid helps to diminish poverty 
in East Asia, it adversely affects poverty in low-income countries. Moreover, Masud and 
Yontcheva (2005) stipulate that there is no palpable evidence that aid eliminates income 
disparities.  
These views above are consistent with the work by Chong, Gradstein, and Calderon 
(2009) who try to empirically examine the effect of foreign aid on inequality and poverty during 
the time frame 1972-2002. They approach the question using two econometric techniques: first 
with a cross sectional analysis and second with a panel data method to tackle potential 
endogeneity and persistence issues. In both the cross sectional approach and panel data analysis, 
they consecutively run inequality and various measures of poverty on foreign aid, foreign aid 
squared, corruption, the interactive term between foreign aid and corruption, schooling, the share 
of agriculture and industry in the total output, and income per capita. The poverty measures used 
are: the headcount index, the poverty gap, and the squared poverty gap, while the Gini 
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coefficient is used as a proxy for inequality.  They uncover that though aid may lower the misery 
of the most vulnerable, especially when corruption is low, foreign aid insignificantly affects 
poverty and income inequality. 
 However, they fail to consider how foreign aid’s impact on poverty and income 
inequality differs across regions. In fact aid could be less effective or perhaps has a more positive 
effect in other regions, but Chong et al. (2009) did not find this because they constrained their 
model to be the same across regions. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine if foreign 
aid differently impacts inequality and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa following the 
methodological approach of Chong et al. (2009).  The emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa seems 
interesting because of its singularity: the highest level of ethnic fractionalization and the greatest 
number of illegitimate states (Englebert, 2000). 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides some of the reasons why foreign 
aid’s effect can differ in sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 deals with the methodology and data.  
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5 offers the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2   
PARTICULARITY OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 The case of sub-Saharan Africa seems particular.  The hope arisen at independence in the 
1960’s that aid would quickly lead to growth and eradicate poverty collapsed, despite the 
potential of the region. After receiving foreign aid for nearly five decades Africa still has the 
highest level of inequality and poverty. The causes of this terrible reality can mainly be found in 
the lack of legitimacy of political regimes, the ethnic fractionalization, and the resultant 
sociopolitical instability, high level of corruption, and low schooling. These characteristics 
presumably affect how aid is managed in sub-Saharan Africa.  
1) Legitimacy and institutional weakness 
For Englebert (2000), while in Asia the independent nations were quite the same as the 
pre-colonial kingdoms and states built through a common assumed history, most of the 
postcolonial African nations were more like conglomerates of communities,  more a creation of 
the colonial master than true states. None of the new states matched with the pre-colonial states. 
For example, the Ashanti kingdom and the Mossy Empire were embedded in the new Ghana and 
Burkina Faso.  The political regimes of these young nations, exogenously created by Europeans, 
suffered legitimacy, which hampered their ability to conceive development- oriented policies for 
two reasons: sociopolitical instability and institutional weakness. 
The new leaders, collaborators with the colonial administration, were not members of the 
pre-colonial and traditional aristocracy; they were seen as atypical leaders, and were 
systematically contested. Englebert (2000) unveils that the lack of legitimacy has been one of the 
main causes of political and social instability in sub-Saharan African countries. Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000) assert that sub-Saharan Africa witnessed 40% of the civil wars between 1945 
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and 1997. Ericksson, Wallensteen, and Sollenberg (2003) affirm that 50% percent of the ongoing 
internal conflicts were in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, every country in West Africa 
witnessed a military coup or rebellion. Englebert (2000) uncovers that the exogenous conception 
of African states damaged the cohesion and development of the nation, altering by the same way 
the quality of their institutions. For Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), the institutional alteration 
favors civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, Ake (1996) affirms that the instability has 
prevented the continent from focusing on developmental issues. Civil wars have perverted the 
quality of institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. In this situation, it is less likely that foreign aid will 
lead to policies lowering inequality and poverty.   
This growing instability slowed down economic progress. The contested regimes 
hardened themselves, establishing autocratic and corrupt regimes, whose main goal was to 
consolidate power and privilege. They were inclined to greater corruption. Moreover, they 
established institutions and institutional designs enabling them to preserve their privilege     (van 
de Walle, 2001). Supposedly, illegitimate regimes could use aid less effectively; aid could be 
used to reward political supporters, instead of poverty and inequality reduction. 
Additionally, African states inherited weak institutions, less appropriate for generating 
wealth, from the colonial masters (Platteau, 2009). Because the environment of sub-Saharan 
Africa being hostile to a significant European settlement, the colonial governments built 
institutions adapted to resource extraction (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). Because 
institutions are persistent over time, these pernicious institutions led to extractive economies  that 
are less likely  to adequately manage aid and implement development oriented  policies capable 
of lowering income disparity and poverty.  Moreover, African leaders presumably perverted the 
already weak institutions inherited through a growing corruption, and the apparent hostility to 
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any kind of institutional improvement (van de Walle, 2001). Accordingly, the institutional 
weakness and the lack of legitimacy led to bad governance and harmful policies intended to 
protect the privileges of less accountable and authoritarian political elites, as in the case of 
Zimbabwe, and Congo (the former Zaire) (Svensson,2005). Consequently, inequality and 
poverty grew regardless of the good intention of donors to alleviate poverty. 
2) Ethnic fractionalization  
 There is a link between ethnic fractionalization and the growing economic malaise in sub 
Saharan Africa. Because of colonization, sub-Saharan African countries have the highest ethnic 
heterogeneity in the world (Easterly and Levine, 1997); the colonial masters in order to maintain 
their hegemony exacerbated the differences between the various ethnic communities within their 
colonies. The ethnic heterogeneity has led to the development of ethnocentrism, the ethnic 
polarization of political elites, and conflicts detrimental to the development of the continent 
(Krause and Suzuki, 2005). In this situation, any resource including foreign aid will be diverted 
from development projects and used to consolidate the ethnic hegemony or simply used to 
reward political allies. Furthermore, regions are excluded from development programs because 
of their ethnic origin.  Ethnic heterogeneity led to less efficient development strategies, and 
increasing corruption (Easterly and Levine, 1997). African political regimes often acquire 
legitimacy from ethnic groups, since even in democracy votes are ethnically driven (Norris and 
Mattes, 2003); candidates belonging to the main ethnic groups are more likely to gain power. In 
this situation politicians feel more accountable to their ethnic groups than to the nation. The 
resulting lack of national legitimacy weakened the potential of successive governments to 
promote inequality and poverty alleviating policies and to allocate foreign aid to the needy.  The 
ethnic fractionalization of sub-Saharan countries has had a ruining effect on the capability of aid 
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to reduce inequality and poverty, because of the rent seeking inherent to polarized societies. The 
fractionalization favored growth reducing and suboptimal policies (Alesina, 1994); Africa has 
the lowest investment records in human capital, which negatively affected the ability to manage 
aid to build development infrastructure (Englebert, 2000). Milanovic (2003) claims that the high 
ethnic diversity has been the main cause of the increasing income inequality and poverty in 
Africa. Moreover, the exacerbation of ethnic antagonisms and discrimination by polarized and 
corrupt political elites has led to civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa like the Rwandan case in  the 
early 1990’s, destroying development infrastructure like schools, bridges, and hospitals. 
Consequently, inequality and poverty worsened (Milanovic, 2003). In addition ethnic 
marginalization might affect the civic culture of marginalized groups, further weakening 
institutions. In this hostile environment, it seems hard to implement any workable redistributive 
policies, and foreign aid could fail to reduce inequality and poverty. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1) Data 
The data used in this paper comes from the same sources as those used by Chong et al. 
(2009). Our data cover the time frame 1972-2008
1
. Table 1 lists the variables and their 
sources
2
, while table 2a and table 2b, respectively, furnish the summary statistics of cross-
sectional data for all aid recipient countries and sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, 
table 3a and table 3b present the summary statistics for the panel data for aid recipient 
countries and sub-Saharan African countries. 
Table1: Variables and their sources 
Variables  Sources  
Gini index  United Nations (WIID 2008)  
Poverty headcount index PovcalNet, World bank,2010 
Poverty gap PovcalNet, World bank,2010 
Squared poverty gap PovcalNet, World bank,2010 
Official development assistance (ODA) OECD,2010  
Effective development assistance (EDA) OECD,2010 
Commitment  OECD,2010 
GDP per capita  WDI 2010,World bank 
Inflation rate  WDI 2010,World bank 
Liquid liabilities WDI 2010,World bank 
Primary Enrollment WDI 2010,World bank, Barro and Lee (2011) 
Corruption International country risk guide ( ICRG 2009) 
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Agriculture value added WDI 2010,World bank 
Industry value added  WDI 2010,World bank 
We consider three measures of foreign aid. The ODA, official development assistance, 
comprises grants and concessional loans net of repayments, and debt forgiveness. The EDA, 
                                                          
1
 Chong et al. (2009) consider 1972-2005 
2
 For the definition and details about the variables see Chong et al. (2009) 
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effective development assistance, does not take into account concessional loans, and it is 
available only for the period 1975-1995. To get an approximation for EDA over the entire 
period, we take advantage of the high correlation between ODA and EDA, so we run a 
regression of EDA on ODA. Finally, Commitment considers not only the components of ODA 
but also firm obligations.  The foreign aid measures are in current US dollars. 
The Gini coefficient is used as a proxy for inequality. The Gini coefficient is chosen 
because of its availability and its ability to reflect households’ income and expenditures. 
However, because the index is computed from surveys, it can be noisy. Moreover, it can be 
subject to compatibility issues because the surveys’ methodology may vary from one survey to 
another.  The index may be income-based, consumption-based individual-based, or household-
based.  
 The poverty measures are available from the early 1980’s, and are computed on the basis 
of a $ 1.25 PPP per day threshold. Three measures are considered in this analysis: the headcount 
index, the poverty gap, and the squared poverty gap. The headcount index captures the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line, while the poverty gap reveals the intensity 
and the prevalence of poverty. In addition, squared poverty gap captures the variations in the 
harshness of poverty and distributional variations among the poor. For both inequality and 
poverty measures, when for a country several measures are reported for a particular year, we 
choose the one representing the best quality data. Moreover, for countries with high levels of 
urbanization, like those in Latin America, only the urban inequality or poverty measures are 
used. 
The other variables used in the analysis are: the enrollment rate, GDP per capita, GDP, 
liquid liabilities, the share of agriculture in output, and the share of industry in output. GDP per 
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capita is evaluated in year 2000 constant dollars; while GDP is evaluated in current US dollars 
because the foreign aid being also evaluated in current US dollar the ratio of aid to GDP remains 
unaffected by price fluctuations. In addition, to complete the data on education, we exploit the 
dataset of Barro and Lee (2011) to get data missing between 1972 and 1990 in the World Bank 
dataset. The Barro-Lee educational attainment database covers 146 countries over the period 
1950-2010.These control variables are considered because they can help assess inequality and 
poverty. For illustration, economists believe that higher level of educational attainment is 
associated with lower inequality (Sylwester, 2003). Moreover, higher inflation may aggravate the 
severity of poverty, since inflation negatively affects the purchasing power of consumers.  
Furthermore, it is believed that higher levels of income per capita are associated with lower 
levels of inequality and poverty (Kuznets, 1955). The initial income per capita is necessary to 
capture the importance of initial conditions among aid recipient countries. 
Table2a: cross sectional summary statistics for the entire sample  
Variables  Mean  Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. Obs 
Gini index 50 48.6 78.6 28.9 10.6 116 
headcount index 52.5 54.3 92.6 4.7 22.1 92 
Poverty gap  23.3 21.1 63.3 0.7 14.1 92 
Squared poverty gap  13.4 11 48.5 0.1 10.3 92 
ODA/GDP 9.7 7 71.8 0.2 9.5 350 
Commitment/ GDP 11.2 6.5 126.8 0 14.7 349 
EDA/GDP 6.8 4.8 62.3 -0.3 7.6 349 
Corruption index 3.3 3 6 0.1 1.5 279 
Primary enrollment  18.4 14 94.2 1 16 340 
Inflation rate  42.1 10.3 8603.3 -4.5 482 318 
Liquid liabilities  29.7 22.5 595.2 1.2 38.7 328 
Log GDP per capita  6 5.8 8.8 4.2 0.9 350 
share of industry  24.7 20.7 64.2 1.9 12.1 350 
share of agriculture  32.2 32.3 94 2 16.1 350 
 
Table2b: cross sectional summary statistics for sub-Saharan Africa countries  
Variables   Mean  Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. Obs 
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Gini index  50.3 50.3 65.7 37 7.7 31 
Headcount index  51.9 58.1 84 4.8 21.8 29 
Poverty gap  23.2 25.8 41.3 0.9 12.3 29 
Squared poverty gap  13.4 14.5 26.7 0.3 8.2 29 
ODA/GDP 9.6 9 30.4 0.3 6.6 31 
Commitment/GDP 10.9 10.2 27.7 0.4 7 31 
EDA/GDP 6.9 6.4 21.6 0.2 5 31 
Corruption index  3.2 2.9 5.7 0.8 1.2 31 
Primary enrollment  18.6 17 55.8 3.2 11.3 31 
Inflation rate  39.5 10.4 781.3 3.3 138.2 31 
Liquid liabilities  29.9 23.4 111 9.3 20.7 31 
Log initialGDPper 
capita  6 5.9 8.2 4.7 0.8 25 
Log GDP per capita  6 5.8 8.4 4.7 0.9 31 
Share of industry  24.5 20.1 53.8 11.5 11 31 
Share of agriculture  31.9 31.5 56 3.5 15.1 31 
Ethnic fractionalization  0.7 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.2 31 
 
Table3a: panel data summary statistics for the entire sample 
Variables  Mean  Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. Obs 
Gini index 42.7 43 78.6 20 11.1 700 
headcount index 22.6 12.8 94.1 0 24.9 439 
Poverty gap  8.6 3.5 63.3 0 11.8 439 
Squared poverty gap  4.5 1.3 48.5 0 7.4 439 
ODA/GDP 5.2 2.2 71.8 -0.5 7.3 1020 
Commitment/ GDP 6.1 2 126.8 -0.5 10.4 1009 
EDA/GDP 3.6 1.3 62.3 -0.9 5.6 1052 
Corruption index 3.5 3.6 6 0.1 1.5 951 
Primary enrollment  41.6 36.9 111.9 1 28.3 995 
Inflation rate  59 9.7 8603.3 -4.5 400 1025 
Liquid liabilities  40 32.5 595.2 0 32.8 1016 
Log GDP per capita  7 7 10.4 4.2 1.2 1146 
share of industry  30.2 29.5 66.9 1.9 11.1 1097 
share of agriculture  22.4 20.2 94 0.1 14.8 1100 
 
 
Table3b: panel data summary statistics for sub-Saharan Africa countries  
Variables  Mean  Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. Obs 
11 
 
 
Gini index 50 48.6 78.6 28.9 10.6 116 
headcount index 52.5 54.3 92.6 4.7 22.1 92 
Poverty gap  23.3 21.1 63.3 0.7 14.1 92 
Squared poverty gap  13.4 11 48.5 0.1 10.3 92 
ODA/GDP 9.7 7 71.8 0.2 9.5 350 
Commitment/ GDP 11.2 6.5 126.8 0 14.7 349 
EDA/GDP 6.8 4.8 62.3 -0.3 7.6 349 
Corruption index 3.3 3 6 0.1 1.5 279 
Primary enrollment  18.4 14 94.2 1 16 340 
Inflation rate  42.1 10.3 8603.3 -4.5 482 318 
Liquid liabilities  29.7 22.5 595.2 1.2 38.7 328 
Log GDP per capita  6 5.8 8.8 4.2 0.9 350 
share of industry  24.7 20.7 64.2 1.9 12.1 350 
share of agriculture  32.2 32.3 94 2 16.1 350 
 
 From the tables above it appears that on average sub-Saharan Africa exhibits the higher 
levels of inequality and poverty than the rest of developing countries. For example, the levels of 
the headcount index, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap in sub-Saharan Africa are twice the 
size of these indicators among developing countries. Furthermore, on average there is more 
foreign aid flowing into sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the developing countries. For 
illustration, the ratio of foreign aid to GDP in sub-Saharan Africa is double the average level 
among developing countries. Moreover, it comes from the tables that sub-Saharan Africa 
experienced greater corruption than did other developing countries. Besides these observations, 
one can remark that sub-Saharan Africa is more rural, and it has less schooling and higher 
inflation. 
2) Methodology  
To examine the impact of foreign aid on poverty and income inequality, I will use 
two regression methods: a cross sectional analysis and a panel data approach. 
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2.1) Cross-sectional analysis  
The following specification is utilized to unveil the effect of foreign aid on 
inequality and poverty in aid recipient countries. 
* *i i i i iy N Aid SSA Aid SSA            
Though the econometric methodology does follow Chong et al. (2009), the 
specification in this paper does not consider any measure of institutional quality because the 
aid literature recognizes that the quality of institutions does not necessarily reduce inequality 
and poverty (Easterly,2007; Chong et al.2009). Moreover, we did run specifications taking 
into account corruption but the outcome was unable to affect the results found in this paper. 
Like in Chong et al. (2009) iy  represents average
3
 of the inequality measure, namely the Gini 
index, when the estimation is about inequality. Analogously, it represents one of the various 
poverty proxies (headcount index, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap), when considering 
poverty. iN   is a matrix of averages of control variables such as primary school enrollment 
rate , liquid liability,  inflation rate, the share of agriculture and industry in output, and  the 
initial level of per capita income. Furthermore, SSA is a dummy variable; it takes the value 1 
if the country is a sub-Saharan Africa country and zero otherwise.   If  is significantly 
different from zero, foreign aid may differently impact inequality and poverty in sub-Saharan 
Africa. These control variables are chosen because they can presumably help to assess the 
phenomenon of inequality and poverty, and their omission may introduce a bias in the 
                                                          
3
 The time frame of the averages is the period 1972-2008 for inequality and 1980-2008 for the estimation of 
poverty. 
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coefficient estimates.  From this specification, it is assumed that the effect of foreign aid on 
inequality and poverty is symmetric, and also this effect does not vary from one country to 
another. This assumption is arguable since countries differ from each other.  
However, there are some concerns about the explanatory variables which may hamper 
the quality of the results. First, the relatively high number of missing data may alter the 
significance of the regressors’ coefficients. Second, there is a problem of reverse causation; a 
higher level of poverty and inequality can command a higher level of foreign aid. Moreover, 
poverty may affect per capita income; for example, the greater the poverty level, the lower the 
per capita income (Ravallion and Datt, 2002). To help remedy these problems, a dynamic 
panel data approach will be used. 
2.2) Dynamic panel data analysis 
, 1 * *it it i t it it i ity N y Aid SSA Aid              
Though cross sectional analysis captures between country variation, it fails to capture 
variations over time within a country. Consequently, an OLS panel data regression with fixed 
effects is considered to help tackle endogeneity and persistence issues. Along with the other 
control variables, we control for the lagged values of the dependent variable.   The country fixed 
effect, i , may capture the within country time invariant specifics, while the time fixed effects 
may capture global shocks. The fixed effects may potentially reduce the coefficients on foreign 
aid and the interactive term between foreign aid and sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to the 
cross section outcome. Though the persistence issue will be resolved, there may be a problem of 
serial correlation in the error term.  The predetermined nature of economic variables commands a 
careful use of models with fixed effects (Maddala and Lahiri, 2009).Moreover, the small number 
14 
 
 
of periods may suppose the use of the OLS method inappropriate, since the conventional wisdom 
commands the use of a GMM method in case of a small time span. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS 
Table 4a presents the cross sectional regression results of the effect of foreign aid on 
inequality. 
Table 4 a: Cross-section regression results for inequality 
 
Dependent variable : Gini coefficient 
  
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP 
 
EDA/GDP 
       CONSTANT 54.636
***4 
 
53.813
*** 
  
57.149
*** 
 
(4.876)
5
 
 
(4.780) 
  
(4.905) 
AID 0.809
** 
 
0.710
** 
  
1.183
** 
 
(2.084) 
 
(2.003) 
  
(2.289) 
AID*SSA -0.653 
 
-0.557 
  
-0.833 
 
(-1.605) 
 
(-1.490) 
  
(-1.537) 
INFLATION  0.011
** 
 
0.011
** 
  
0.012
** 
 
(2.111) 
 
(2.126) 
  
(2.222) 
LIQUID LIABILITIES -0.066
** 
 
-0.064
** 
  
-0.062
** 
 
(-2.355) 
 
(-2.251) 
  
(-2.119) 
ENROLLMENT  -0.156
*** 
 
-0.154
*** 
  
-0.205
*** 
 
(-2.681) 
 
(-2.646) 
  
(-3.727) 
LOG INITIAL GDP PER 
CAPITA  1.473 
 
1.494 
  
1.503 
 
(1.209) 
 
(1.222) 
  
(1.186) 
AGRICULTURE VALUE 
ADDED  -0.347
*** 
 
-0.341
*** 
  
-0.390
*** 
 
(-2.752) 
 
(-2.695) 
  
(-3.035) 
INDUSTRY VALUE 
ADDED  -0.118 
 
-0.109 
  
-0.133 
 
(-1.250) 
 
(-1.155) 
  
(-1.347) 
SSA 4.845
* 
 
4.861
* 
  
3.699 
 
(1.790) 
 
(1.696) 
  
(1.320) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS  70. 
 
70. 
  
72. 
R-SQUARED 0.418 
 
0.415 
  
0.444 
 
                                                          
4
 *** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5%level, and * significance at 10%level. 
5
 Numbers in parentheses allude to t-statistic 
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Table 4b presents the cross sectional regression results of the effect of foreign aid on poverty. 
Three measures of poverty are considered: headcount index, poverty gap, and squared poverty 
gap. 
Table 4b: Cross-section regression results for poverty 
 
Dependent variable: Poverty gap
6
  
   
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP 
 
EDA/GDP 
        AID -0.178 
  
0.057 
  
-0.402 
 
(-0.377) 
  
(0.130) 
  
(-0.727) 
AID*SSA 0.491 
  
0.605 
  
0.830 
 
(1.030) 
  
(1.374) 
  
(1.465) 
SSA 3.730 
  
0.639 
  
3.551 
 
(1.055) 
  
(0.176) 
  
(1.042) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS  68. 
  
68. 
  
73. 
R-SQUARED 0.682 
  
0.707 
  
0.699 
        
 
Dependent variable: Headcount index 
   
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP 
 
EDA/GDP 
        AID -0.757 
  
-0.273 
  
-1.038 
 
(-0.885) 
  
(-0.337) 
  
(-1.031) 
AID*SSA 1.056 
  
1.162 
  
1.361 
 
(1.221) 
  
(1.432) 
  
(1.319) 
SSA 5.785 
  
0.693 
  
5.927 
 
(0.903) 
  
(0.104) 
  
(0.956) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS  68. 
  
68. 
  
73. 
R-SQUARED 0.745 
  
0.757 
  
0.763 
        
 
Dependent variable: Squared poverty gap 
  
        
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP 
 
EDA/GDP 
        AID -0.037 
  
0.089 
  
-0.203 
 
(-0.115) 
  
(0.298) 
  
(-0.544) 
AID*SSA 0.278 
  
0.370 
  
0.557 
 
(0.862) 
  
(1.242) 
  
(1.457) 
SSA 2.543 
  
0.565 
  
2.279 
                                                          
6
 For poverty for all specifications only the key variables are reported. The control variables are the same as those 
in table 4a. 
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(1.063) 
  
(0.230) 
  
(0.992) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS  68. 
  
68. 
  
73 
R-SQUARED 0.626 
  
0.656 
  
0.644 
 
The cross sectional results suggest that there is an insignificant association between 
foreign aid and inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the results insinuate that sub-
Saharan Africa specifics may be important for inequality. Variables such as enrollment, liquid 
liabilities lessen inequality. In addition, foreign aid has no significant association with poverty in 
sub-Saharan Africa. However, education, and initial income level appear crucial for poverty. 
Table 5a presents the panel data regression output revealing the incidence of foreign aid 
on inequality, while table 5b shows the effect of foreign aid on the various measures of poverty. 
Table5a: OLS Panel regression results for inequality 
 
Dependent variable : Gini coefficient 
 
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP EDA/GDP 
      CONSTANT 33.607
 
 
48.606
** 
 
42.657
** 
 
(1.492) 
 
(2.147) 
 
(2.008) 
AID 0.220 
 
-0.082 
 
-0.526 
 
(0.783) 
 
(-0.485) 
 
(-1.694) 
AID*SSA 0.225 
 
-0.363 
 
0.246 
 
(0.584) 
 
(-1.497) 
 
(0.689) 
INFLATION 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
(0.214) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.004) 
LIQUID LIABILITIES -0.031 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.016 
 
(-0.791) 
 
(-0.601) 
 
(-0.421) 
ENROLLMENT -0.087
** 
 
-0.084
** 
 
-0.059 
 
(-1.949) 
 
(-1.905) 
 
(-1.345) 
LOGGDP PER CAPITA  2.825 
 
0.816 
 
1.236 
 
(0.918) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.427) 
LAG OF GINI 0.021 
 
0.042 
 
0.052 
 
(0.313) 
 
(0.629) 
 
(0.782) 
AGRICULTURE VALUE 
ADDED  0.341
** 
 
0.282
* 
 
0.336
** 
 
(2.307) 
 
(1.852) 
 
(2.471) 
INDUSTRY VALUE -0.280
*** 
 
-0.247
** 
 
-0.270
*** 
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ADDED  
 
(-2.784) 
 
(-2.483) 
 
(-2.898) 
COUNTRY FIXED 
EFFECT  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
TIME FIXED EFFECT  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
R-SQUARED 0.839 
 
0.840 
 
0.863 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 265. 
 
264. 
 
285. 
NUMBER OF CROSS-
SECTIONS  66. 
 
66. 
 
75. 
      
      Table5b: OLS Panel regression results for poverty 
 
Dependent variable: Squared poverty gap  
  
        
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP 
 
EDA/GDP 
        AID -0.261
** 
  
-0.048 
  
-0.009 
 
(-1.573) 
  
(-0.606) 
  
(-0.046) 
AID*SSA 0.249
* 
  
-0.294 
  
0.151 
 
(1.189) 
  
(-2.331) 
  
(0.734) 
COUNTRY FIXED 
EFFECT Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
TIME FIXED EFFECT Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS  152 
  
152. 
  
162 
NUMBER OF CROSS-
SECTION 52. 
  
52. 
  
59 
R-SQUARED 0.944 
  
0.952 
  
0.945 
        
 
Dependent variable: Headcount index 
   
        
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP 
 
EDA/GDp 
        AID -1.251
** 
  
-0.231 
  
0.264 
 
(-2.502) 
  
(-0.879) 
  
(0.427) 
AID*SSA 1.340
** 
  
-0.043 
  
-0.030 
 
(2.131) 
  
(-0.106) 
  
(-0.047) 
COUNTRY FIXED 
EFFECT Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
TIME FIXED EFFECT Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS  152. 
  
152. 
  
162. 
NUMBER OF CROSS-
SECTION 52 
  
52 
  
59 
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R-SQUARED 0.971 
  
0.970 
  
0.971 
 
 
 
       
 
Dependent variable: Poverty gap  
   
        
 
ODA/GDP 
 
Commitment/GDP 
 
EDA/GDP 
        AID -0.521 
  
-0.109 
  
-0.017 
 
(-2.040) 
  
(-0.853) 
  
(-0.055) 
AID*SSA 0.521 
  
-0.279 
  
0.186 
 
(1.630) 
  
(-1.399) 
  
(0.574) 
COUNTRY FIXED 
EFFECT Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
TIME FIXED EFFECT Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS  152. 
  
152. 
  
162 
NUMBER OF CROSS-
SECTION 52. 
  
52. 
  
59. 
R-SQUARED 0.957 
  
0.959 
  
0.957 
 
 The OLS panel regression indicates that foreign aid does not have any significant 
association with inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture and industrialization do seem 
decisive; the lower the agriculture sector the less inequality is, but the higher the industrial sector 
the less inequality can be. Furthermore, it can be inferred that the official development assistance 
does have a negative and statistically significant association with poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This finding fails to hold while using alternative definitions of foreign aid. 
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
The results have to be taken with caution, because the absence of a statistically 
significant coefficient does not mean that aid is harmful or irrelevant for inequality and poverty 
reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. This can be explained by several reasons. First, it may mean 
that inequality and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is so high that the amount of foreign aid 
disbursed seems insignificant. Moreover, the ability of aid to effectively lower inequality and 
poverty can be diluted because donors may be motivated by other considerations like strategic 
interest, retribution of allies or even colonial past which are not necessarily in conformity with 
poverty alleviation (Alesina and Collier, 2000). 
 It also might be the case, when it occurred; that excessive monitoring does create some 
disturbances in the implementation of inequality and poverty reduction programs (Easterly, 
2007). The top down reforms imposed upon sub-Saharan African countries in order to be eligible 
for aid are not necessarily conducive to lower poverty and inequality, and they might undermine 
the ability of aid to alleviate poverty (Easterly, 2009).Sometimes, the failure of coordination 
between the various aid agencies operating through NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa and the local 
governments may be damageable to the success of aid programs (van de Walle, 2003).  
 Furthermore, the absence of significant results may be due to the lack of systematic 
evaluation and feedback of aid programs, the lack of transparency of donors and the negligence 
of local officials while conceiving aid projects (Easterly, 2003). In addition, one can consider 
that foreign aid does not have a lasting effect, since the absorptive capacity of population in sub-
Saharan Africa to maintain infrastructure is quite low. Moreover, the developmental approach 
used by donors to tackle poverty and inequality in sub-Saharan Africa allows for the repetition of 
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previous errors which led to the ineffectiveness of several aid projects (Easterly, 2009). Donors 
do not necessarily discriminate against countries or regimes where leaders are corrupt and less 
answerable (Alesina and Weder, 2002). This view is also consistent with the work by Easterly 
and Pfutze (2008), who unveil that increasing level of foreign aid has been given to autocratic 
regimes. Svensson (2000) reports that foreign aid favors corruption. 
 Furthermore, it can be that political elites, in sub Saharan Africa, do divert foreign aid to 
projects unable to lower inequality and poverty (World Bank, 1998). It is common to observe in 
sub-Saharan Africa the looting of the aid disbursed by corrupt and less accountable political 
elites, due to the absence of democratic and credible institutions (Boone, 1996). Moreover, 
foreign aid might hardly reach the needy of sub-Saharan Africa because of the possibility of 
elites to divert to themselves any available resource and this even under democracy (Bjornskov, 
2010). Finally, because sub-Saharan African countries are reluctant to pursue reforms leading to 
institutional improvement, foreign aid may barely be effective in reducing poverty and inequality 
(van de Walle, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION  
Throughout this paper, there is weak evidence that foreign aid does worsen inequality and 
poverty in sub Saharan Africa; however, this finding fails to be robust to alternative measures of 
foreign aid. This indicates that the findings of Chong et al. (2009) were not driven by differences 
between sub-Saharan Africa and other regions averaging out to zero. In addition, it appears that 
local conditions and the relative weight of agriculture and industry do account for inequality and 
poverty outcomes. The weakness of the findings may be due to the unavailability of data, and a 
possible endogenous nature of some variables like agriculture and enrollment. These variables 
may be dependent on foreign aid. In future work, I try to address these problems of endogeneity.   
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF COUNTRIES IN THE ENTIRE SAMPLE  
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Republic, Israel, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Republic, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, RB, Vietnam, Yemen, Rep., 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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